Perspective
Columbia/HCA: Villain Or Victim?
Our health care system is the product of the interactions of providers, lobbyists, and government. No one sector should be singled out when problems arise.
by Uwe E. Reinhardt B u r ied i n J.D. K lei nke 's lengthy brief for Columbia/HCA are a number of points that are worth noting at the outset.
First, the manner in which government procures goods and services from private, incomeseeking purveyors is always problematic, whether the purveyors are defense contractors, educational institutions, or the providers of health care. The retrospective, full-cost reimbursement by which Medicare has compensated the suppliers of home and skilled nursing care is particularly prone to problems. It subjects these purveyors to the same temptation that is faced by the millions of good citizens whose travel expenses are reimbursed retrospectively by their employers or clients and who forever make delicate judgments on what part of their many personal outlays on dinners, taxis, or telephone calls can legitimately be charged as travel expenses. To reduce that temptation, someone has to spell out in excruciating detail what is and is not to be reimbursed. Even after these rules have been written, there remains a large gray zone for errors and subtle judgments.
Second, Kleinke may be right that the prolonged investigation of Columbia/HCA is intended as a shot across the bow of the entire health care industry. On the other hand, the information reportedly volunteered by scores of disillusioned former employees of Columbia/HCA, coupled with the spotlight the media had trained on this swashbuckling company for some time, probably would have made it difficult for the government to avoid a major and highly publicized investigation of Columbia/HCA. How could it have responded otherwise to the allegations made by the whistle-blowers and the media, especially when on the campaign stump both Republican and Democratic politicians regularly bewail the "fraud and abuse" in government programs and point to that "fraud and abuse" as a major potential source of financing promised tax cuts or still more government programs?
Kleinke is properly cautious in withholding judgment on the accuracy of the accusations against Columbia/HCA. It is anybody's guess what the investigation will unearth. But he would probably share my surprise if the actual dollar amount of fraud the government can prove in court would exceed even one-half of 1 percent of the company's total billing to the government over the period in question.
1 Unless whistle-blowers provide the government with irrefutable evidence of premeditated, massive, pervasive fraud, the bulk of the items at issue probably will be disposed of as random errors or as judgment calls on which reasonable people could disagree. Of course, in the end the company may try simply to buy out of the bad publicity of a prolonged, torturous trial by agreeing to pay a major fine, perhaps in the billions. All things considered, payment of a preemptive fine might be cost-effective from the share-holders' perspective.
In this connection, Kleinke is right to remind us of government's awesome power to torment and even to destroy individuals and institutions simply through prolonged investigations. Next to a major illness, falling into the sights of a government investigation-or a special prosecutor-must rank as one of the more terrifying events in an American's life. One would hope that the investigation into Columbia/HCA itself will be formally held to account for its own conduct.
These points are all worth making. Unfortunately, however, Kleinke taints them with an evident bias, because he embeds them in a veritable morality play that is cast with that bias. On the evil side of that morality play stands the feder al govern men t, cast by Kleinke as the sole culprit behind the many systemic problems besetting the American health care system. In keeping with Kleinke's self-confessed predilection for the private sector, there is not even a hint in his paper that the private sector itself might have played a part in the despoiling. On the good side of Kleinke's morality play stands Columbia/ HCA, that visionary Lone Ranger who was way ahead of everyone else in getting ready for the twenty-first century. In Kleinke's tale Columbia/HCA comes across as the impetus in the nation's drive toward clinically and economically integrated health care systems that are capable of assuming full financial risk for the comprehensive health care needs of enrolled populations and that are willing to be held openly accountable for the clinical quality and patient satisfaction achieved with that care-as if the long-established staff-and group-model health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and some of the more progressive not-for-profit health systems needed to be shown the way. It is a tall tale, one that could not have been penned better by Columbia/ HCA's own public relations department. But the tale is set in a data-free context and therefore takes too many liberties with facts.
The System In Perspective
It is not clear whether Kleinke considers it a systemic shortcoming of our health care system that Congress voted in the 1960s to assist the millions of Americans who had traditionally been shunned by private health insurers and who could not afford to purchase appropriate health care with their own resources. 2 Whatever the reader may infer from his paper on that point, there remains the question of why Kleinke singles out public health insurance programs as the sole culprit that "grossly distorted the relationship betw een health care supply and demand." Did private insurance not distort that relationship as well? Those who know the history of Medicare and Medicaid recall that when these programs were introduced in the mid-1960s, they had to adapt themselves strictly to private-sector norms. Thus, as part of the deal cut between government and physicians, Medicare was to pay each physician the "usual, customary, and reasonable" fees that he or she was paid by private insurers. Similarly, for hospitals, Medicare was to follow the compensation method then favored by the dominant private payer, Blue Cross, which relied on retrospective reimbursement of costs, replete with a complex step-down algorithm for overhead allocation. Other private insurers simply paid each hospital whatever that hospital charged for each and every day, procedure, bandage, or pill-a method that routinely produced those humor-inspiring hospital bills stretching over several feet, even for short inpatient episodes. Blue Cross eventually adopted that openended charge method as well.
Throughout their history, both Medicare and Medicaid strained hard but unsuccessfully to keep up with the ever-escalating fees "Kleinke's failure to mention, even in passing, the private sector's role in the health cost crisis of the 1980s is conspicuous." Why it took private payers until the early 1990s before they began to marshal even a modicum of countervailing market power on the demand side of the health sector is an intriguing story that, alas, goes beyond the compass of this Perspective. 4 Suffice it to say that the private sector was the main culprit in triggering the "inevitable cost crises [that] reached their apex in the late 1980s and 1990s." Kleinke's failure to mention, even in passing, the private sector's role in that cost crisis is conspicuous.
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Columbia/HCA's Role
Passing now to the other side of Kleinke's morality play, was Columbia/HCA actually the pioneer in integrated care celebrated in Kleinke's tale-as he puts it, "the impetus for a system seeking to correct a problem nearly half a century in the making[:] . . . the overbuilding of hospital capacity under the HillBurton program and the inadvertent, wasteful inducement of demand for inpatient services under Medicare reimbursement"? Kleinke certainly tries to make that case, but not convincingly. For one, he provides no evidence that Columbia/HCA ever derived a significant fraction of its total revenue from global capitation, in exchange for assuming full financial risk for the comprehensive, clinically inte-grated care of enrolled populations. In fact, given the geographic location of most of the company's hospitals, that fraction is likely to have been trivial. Instead of adducing pertinent data from Columbia/HCA's own experience with global capitation, Kleinke retreats to published studies of other, genuinely integrated health care systems in California that do take global capitation for comprehensive care. In so doing, Kleinke wittingly or unwittingly confuses arrangements under which physicians do assume part or all of the financial risk of illness of enrolled populations with Columbia/ HCA's "physician integration strategy," under which the company merely gave affiliated physicians an equity position in Columbia/ HCA, presumably with the aim of "bonding" physicians to the company's hospitals-that is, of steering their referrals toward Columbia/HCA hospitals. Once again, given the geographic location of most of these hospitals, most of the affiliated physicians were and remain compensated on a fee-for-service basis. That is quite the opposite from assuming financial risk for their patients' illnesses, the imagery Kleinke seeks to evoke with his rendition of integrated health care.
Kleinke salutes Columbia/HCA's unique method of aligning the financial incentives of physicians and hospitals as the sine qua non of an efficient health care system. Other observers decry that approach as a distortion of the doctor/patient relationship. It is a legitimate view, apparently shared by the leaders of the old Hospital Corporation of America (HCA). I recall vividly a speech delivered in the mid-1980s by then HCA chairman Don McNaughton in which he announced as company policy that no physician affiliated with HCA should hold an equity position in the company, so that the physician would be in appearance as well as in fact the faithful agent strictly of the patient. Presumably, the late Thomas Frist Sr. and Thomas Frist Jr., both founders of HCA, stood firmly behind this policy at the time. In fact, it is not at all surprising that among Thomas Frist Jr.'s first announcements upon retaking the reins of Columbia/HCA last year was the severance of any financial ties between the firm and its affiliated physicians. Opposition to such ties is not, as Kleinke would have us believe, evidence that the government harbors a deepseated bias against for-profit medicine.
Rather, it reflects a considered view of the doctor/patient relationship that is probably more widely held among Americans than Kleinke would imagine.
Impact On The Hospital Marketplace
To the extent that Columbia/HCA did contribute to greater economy in American health care, it did so mainly in its earlier incarnation as a pure hospital company, focused mainly on inpatient care. The firm's original strategy, of which much was made in its early years, had been to acquire several hospitals in an overbedded market, to use the unquestioned dictatorial power of a private capitalist ruthlessly in the elimination of costly excess capacity among the acquired hospitals (to the point even of closing some of them entirely), and then to offer patients and their insurers the best value for their money in the local market. It is not clear from the data how successful that strategy turned out to be in practice. Exhibit 3 indicates the remarkably low occupancy rates in the company's hospitals. According to these data, in 1995 the company's median occupancy rate was only 42 percent, which means that half of the company's hospitals had an occupancy rate even lower than that. That occupancy rate is far below the ratio of close to 60 percent for the hospital sector as a whole. 5 If Columbia/HCA did contribute to the consolidation of the hospital sector, it would have done so mainly by frightening other hospitals into preemptive mergers, rather than through consolidation in its own ranks.
Costs Versus Prices
That in 1995 Columbia/HCA achieved a median profit margin of 9.6 percent on its hospitals in spite of their low occupancy rates may seem a miracle, were it not for two factors that boosted these margins.
First, there is a difference between a company's operating costs and the prices it charges its customers. That distinction is frequently overlooked by commentators who have imputed to Columbia/HCA a genius for lowering its operating costs. Low operating costs translate themselves into low prices only when customers bestir themselves to harvest these economies. But even in markets with many price-sensitive payers-notably in California-hospitals still can act like airlines, namely, as profit-maximizing price discriminators who charge different customers different prices for the same service and whose profit margins per service vary strictly with payers' ability to offer the hospital countervailing market power. Although Columbia/ HCA undoubtedly gave some vigilant purchasers steeply discounted prices, I am not aware of any study that showed Columbia/ HCA hospitals to be uniformly the low-price provider of health care overall (that is, for all customers) in the local markets in which it operated.
Medicare's Gushing Spigots
A second source for the firm's remarkably high profit margins, in the face of its remarkably low occupancy rates, has been Medicare's money-gushing spigots for home and skilled nursing care. These irresistible spigots appear to have diverted Columbia/HCA from its erstwhile drive to squeeze excess capacity out of local hospital markets. Of course, thousands of other American hospitals discovered these money-gushing spigots as well and promptly integrated vertically in response, most probably without first waiting for a cue from Columbia/HCA. Congress opened these wondrous spigots in the early 1980s, mainly to take the rough edges off Medicare's newly introduced flat prospective payment per inpatient episode, a compensation method that gave hospitals powerful financial incentives to discharge Medicare patients "quicker and sicker." A subsequent court ruling in the late 1980s opened the spigots even wider.
Responding, no doubt, to the entreaties of the private sector, Congress adopted for home and skilled nursing care the archaic, problemprone, full-cost retrospective reimbursement method. As noted earlier, that method not only is inherently complex, it also tends to trigger what Kleinke delicately calls a "greater level of competence" in seeking compensation from government but what others criticize as pushing the envelope beyond the acceptable limit. In the present case, home and skilled nursing care became new platforms onto which hospitals could shift overhead expenses, out from under the prospective percase reimbursement for inpatient care. Furthermore, Medicare's awkward compensation methods ultimately led it to pay twice for certain days in an inpatient episode: once as part of the flat prospective payment (the diagnosis-related group, or DRG), and one more time under the full-cost reimbursement for home or skilled nursing care made necessary by very early discharges from hospital inpatient carea process that has come to be known as "double dipping." It stretches credulity to see in the strategies pursued by Columbia/HCA a quest to be properly positioned for the long-awaited day of global capitation. A more realistic description would be that Columbia/ HCA has been a normal, revenue-driven company that has instinctively moved its operations into the direction of whatever moneygushing spigot came into view. It is not inherently evil for an investor-owned company to follow such a strategy; shareholders and third-party payers should expect it. The wonder is that Kleinke reads into that very ordinary strategy such lofty vision and purpose.
Whom To Blame?
One can agree with Kleinke that the reimbursement methods adopted by Congress for home and skilled nursing care were dubious from the outset. The question is whom one should blame for this clumsy approach. The custom among executives in the private health sector is to blame the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), as if it were a legislative body, a state within a state, governed by the American analogue of China's Red Guards, which woke up every morning wondering whom next to torment in the de-"Retrospective full-cost reimbursement takes respect for local idiosyncrasies right down to the level of the paper clip."
fense of a dying ideology. It is as refreshing as it is remarkable that Kleinke does not succumb to that myth. As he correctly observes in passing, HCFA merely fine-tunes and administers compensation methods that have been concocted as part of that never-ending game between members of Congress and the legions of lobbyists who besiege the Capitol and who busily help Congress write the laws that it passes. If the private-sector executives who chafe under the complexity of government regulation wished to discover the culprits behind that complexity, and if they wanted to be brutally honest with themselves, they would look into the mirror first, look at Congress next, and only then look at the government bureaucrats who administer the laws hatched out by the former two. One might call insistence that federal laws respect the idiosyncratic needs of so many diverse constituents "American particularism" or, less charitably, "Le Vice Americain," for no other industrial democracy practices this particularism with quite our exuberance and with quite the costly consequences as does the United States. Medicare's arcane reimbursement rules are a classic expression of American particularism, because they pay so much respect to entreaties by individuals and single institutions. Retrospective full-cost reimbursement is the ultimate form of that particularism, for it takes respect for local idiosyncrasies right down to the level of the paper clip. While, in theory, there is something lovely about this enormous respect for individuals and single institutions, it does infuse our laws with an administrative complexity that borders on the criminal in this sense: It has the capacity of criminalizing the behavior of perfectly decent citizens who would never break laws that they can actually understand.
Kleinke suggests that Columbia/HCA may be merely a victim of Medicare's arcane rules. Perhaps it is, along with many other providers of health care whose reputation might not weather a confrontation with hundreds of government auditors. Whatever the case may be, however, it would be unseemly to blame these arcane rules on government alone, and it would be truly egregious to blame it on the hard-working HCFA bureaucrats who must convert bewildering legislative effusions into operational rules that are fair to the millions of Americans who depend on Medicare and Medicaid for their health care, fair to the American taxpayer who foots the bill for these programs, and fair to the income-seeking private purveyors of health care who look upon the American taxpayer as their source of fiscal nourishment.
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